Even with environmental externalities, money metric measures of individual welfare can often be constructed by methods similar to those of Vartia (1983) , provided that individual's willingness to pay functions are known. Satisfactory money metric measures of social welfare are harder, however. Following Feldstein (1974) and Rosen (1976), a "uniform" money metric measure is proposed, based on the uniform poll subsidy (or tax) to all individuals which produces the same gain (or loss) in social welfare. Finally, problems with the definition of such measures when faced with "environmental catastrophe" are discussed.
Introduction
How large are the welfare losses caused by various forms of environmental degradation? This is becoming one of the pressing questions of our time. Some argue that the losses are not very large, and certainly too small to justify the kind of immensely costly measures which seem to be required if the environment is to be greatly improved, or even if the rate of deterioration is to be significantly slowed. Others argue the reverse. This paper will not settle such arguments but will lay out some of the principles involved in measuring such welfare losses.
In fact the problem of determining the welfare losses or gains caused by changes in the environment is just an instance of the general problem of measuring welfare change. There are, however, two distinctions of some importance. First, most welfare measures in the past have been constructed on the assumption that consumers take prices as given, and then adjust quantities optimally in order to maximize their own welfare. With environmental quality, however, it is usually the case that consumers as individuals have little influence.
Environmental quality should therefore be treated as exogenous. Fortunately, it seems easy to adapt standard procedures to cover this case -provided, at least, that enough is known about each consumer's marginal willingness to pay for quality improvements.
There is, however, a second distinction which does make welfare measurement much harder. This is when the quality of the environment deteriorates so badly that the usual money metric measures like equivalent variation become undefined. A similar phenomenon was first noticed by Jones-Lee (1974 in connection with large increases in the probability of death. Individuals may be willing to part with all their possessions rather than face too large a probability of dying suddenly. For similar reasons, money metric measures may be ill equipped to deal with certain kinds of environmental catastrophe.
In addition, while it is true that the principles of constructing money metric measures of welfare change for individuals are gradually becoming well understood, similar measures for society as a whole have been far less satisfactory. Too many "surplus economists" in the past have simply added up equivalent variation over all individuals, treating the monetary gain which a billionaire enjoys from a slight increase in the quality of the wine he drinks on a par with that of a young child from a poor family who receives life-saving medical treatment.
Alternative measures with more reasonable welfare weights have been proposed, of course, but suffer from other disadvantages. For example, the "social expenditure function" due to Pollak (1981) -which has also been used by Jorgenson and Slesnick (1989, 1990) and by Jorgenson (1990) -relies upon non-local information even for small changes in the economic allocation. The alternative approach based on fixed welfare weights which I proposed in Hammond (1984 Hammond ( , 1988 seems neither practical nor easy to interpret. Accordingly, Section 3 below proposes a measure of "uniform equivalent variation," defined as the uniform poll tax or subsidy which would generate the same change in social welfare. This follows a suggestion due to Feldstein (1974, p. 141) and Rosen (1976, p. 110) , who wrote of "uniformly distributed dollars" -see also King (1983) . Since uniform poll subsidies or taxes do seem feasible (if undesirable) policy instruments, there is a sense in which this measure relates to an alternative policy change which could actually be carried out, at least at the local or national level. Also, unlike the social expenditure function, for small changes the uniform equivalent variation will depend only on local information such as price elasticities of demand and relative marginal utilities of income.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shows how to construct money metric measures of individual welfare and of welfare change by adapting the methods devised by Hausman (1981) for dealing with a single price change, and by Vartia (1983) for the more general case when all prices can change. Section 3 applies similar methods to the problem of measuring social welfare and welfare change. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
Individual Welfare

Traded and Non-traded Goods
It will be assumed that there is a finite set G of traded goods, whose prices the consumer takes as exogenous, and a disjoint finite set H of non-traded goods, whose quantities the consumer takes as exogenous.
The traded goods will typically be ordinary physical goods which the consumer is free to buy and sell on competitive markets. In the past the environment has usually been (imperfectly) ameliorated by means of quantitative controls on those activities of each individual and each firm which create pollution or other kinds of externalities. Many economists, however, are now recommending that environmental quality should be assured instead by issuing only a limited number of licences or permits to create certain types of pollution, and only in limited amounts. Many also recommend trying to improve the efficiency of the allocation of pollution rights by allowing such permits to be bought and sold on an open competitive market. To the extent that there are such tradeable licences to cause pollution, they should also be included among the set G of traded goods.
Non-traded goods in the set H, on the other hand, are intended to include everything whose allocation to the consumer is determined by quantitative controls, or by no controls at all. Some components of H will therefore describe environmental quality, others public goods, and yet others any rationing which the consumer faces.
Quantities of these two types of good will be denoted by the two vectors x ∈ G and z ∈ H respectively. For traded goods, including those subject to rationing constraints, these quantities are to be thought of as indicating net trades -i.e., demands minus supplies.
For environmental quality levels beyond the consumer's control, any unambiguous ordinal measure is acceptable for each component of z.
An Ordinal Utility Function
It will also be assumed that the consumer has a well-defined and unique ordinal equivalence class of real-valued utility functions U (x, z). In what follows, U will always stand for some particular utility function of this class -this is just a more precise way of saying that U is an ordinal utility function. The domain of U is taken to be a set F ⊂ G × H of individually feasible pairs (x, z). Apart from the usual endowment and physical feasibility constraints, F should also allow for any domestic production possibilities which the consumer may be able to undertake. It should also embody legal constraints such as the obligation of having a pollution licence, etc.
For fairly obvious technical reasons, it will be assumed that both the consumer's feasible set F and preferences over F allow some utility representation U (x, z) satisfying the following standard assumptions:
e., the set of net trade vectors x which are individually feasible in combination with x -is bounded below in the sense that there exists some x(z) ∈ G with the property that
(A.4) as a function of the net trade vector x alone, the function U (x, z) is strictly quasiconcave;
(A.5) the partial gradient vector U x of U with respect to x is semi-positive (i.e., has no negative components and at least one positive component) at every point of F .
Note in particular that no presumption has been made regarding how U (x, z) changes in response to variations in z. Indeed, nothing has even been assumed about the signs of the various components of the partial gradient vector U z of U with respect to z. After all, what one consumer regards as a beneficial change in one particular exogenous quantity may be quite damaging to somebody else.
Of course, the ordinal equivalence class of utility functions U is assumed to be unknown.
If it were known, then the problem of measuring "economic" welfare -under the important
value judgement that what the consumer prefers is indeed better -would already have been solved. Instead, the problem considered here is precisely to construct a "moneymetric" ordinal representation of the preferences which are revealed by the consumer's own behaviour.
Prices and Marginal Willingness to Pay
Obviously, the construction of a money-metric measure of individual welfare will also require the use of price data. For traded goods in the set G, it is assumed as usual that there is an observable exogenous price vector p ∈ G + \ {0} of non-negative prices which are not all zero. The corresponding income level of the consumer is m = p · x. This must be "unearned income" from dividends and income transfers because all earned income from selling (traded) labour services or other goods is already accounted for in one or more negative terms of the sum
For all non-traded goods in the set H as well, it is assumed that there is a known price vector w ∈ H . Here each component w h of w represents the consumer's marginal willingness to pay to have the exogenous quantity z h changed. In the case of any component h representing a form of environmental quality or some public good, the interpretation of w h is clear and familiar. For any component h representing a rationing constraint, w h represents the shadow price of relaxing the corresponding constraint. A crucial assumption which cannot be avoided here is that some procedure has also been devised for observing each consumer's "marginal willingness to pay vector" w ∈ H . This is a far from innocuous assumption, of course, but without it one would have to embark on a lengthy detour to discuss how to estimate w by indirect methods. Indeed, in the absence of any information whatsoever about w, the task of trying to estimate an individual's direct welfare gains and losses from environmental change is clearly impossible. For example, if not even the sign of w h is known, one cannot even tell whether an increase in z h will benefit or harm the consumer. So, without information about w, at most those indirect gains and losses which arise because new policies only affect the allocation of traded goods to the consumer could be measured. Actually, such indirect gains and losses are often very important. They arise, for instance, whenever a firm is affected by a policy change. Finally, note that even if externality permits are traded, the observed prices can only tell us how much each individual is willing to pay for the right to create each such externality; they cannot tell us the marginal benefits from having everybody create less of the externality in the aggregate.
Implications of Utility Maximization
As usual, it will be assumed that the consumer chooses the endogenous net trade vector 
whenever x satisfies p x ≤ m. Accordingly w, the consumer's marginal willingness to pay for changes in the exogenous quantity vector z, must be a function w(p, m; z) satisfying
The Money Metric Utility Function
In order to construct money metric measures of welfare and of welfare change, it will be necessary to keep fixed both a reference price vector p R ∈ G + and a reference exogenous quantity vector z R ∈ H . Then the money metric direct utility function φ(x, z) is defined implicitly as the solution to the equation 
It has the property that ψ (p, m; z (1) above. 
in money metric utility.
Two particular measures of variation have received much attention in the literature, following Hicks (1939 Hicks ( , 1940 Hicks ( , 1981 . The first is the compensating variation. This arises 
so the measure of welfare change (7) becomes CV : Nothing can be said, however, about whether it increases or decreases as the (probably more interesting) final situation changes.
The second particular measure is the equivalent variation, which arises when (p
, so the initial values of the exogenous prices and quantities are taken as reference (6). So the measure of welfare change (7) becomes EV :
In contrast to the compensating variation, the equivalent variation is higher for better changes from an existing status quo, so can itself be used as a welfare indicator. Since (6) implies that
, the measure EV represents the total amount which the consumer is willing to be paid in order not to make the move from
Small Changes
The problem to be considered next is how to calculate such measures of variation when the indirect utility function is not known. It will be assumed that one knows instead only the vector demand function x(p, m; z) for those goods whose prices are exogenous and whose quantities are endogenous, as well as the vector willingness to pay function w(p, m; z) for those goods whose quantities are exogenous and whose prices are endogenous.
The effect of a small change upon the money metric measure of individual welfare can be found by taking the total differential of (6), which is
where the second equation follows from Roy's identity. So
In the special case when (p, z) is the reference point (p R , z R ) and so ψ(p, m; z) becomes equal to m, this reduces to the familiar form
A Path Differential Equation
In order to be able to compute the effect of any larger change, it is obviously sufficient to know how to find the money metric measure of utility ψ(p,m;z) for any point (p,m,z), and with respect to an arbitrary reference point (p
be any continuously differentiable path, parametrized by the real variable t, whose endpoints
But other paths could be much more convenient instead. Note that the chosen path starts at (p,z), the target point where the money metric is to be evaluated, and then comes back
Along such a path, we will now construct an income compensation function m(t) with the property that
whenever 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. In other words, the path ( p,m;z) . This implies that p,m;z) , and so m(1) is the required money metric measure of utility.
As Houthakker (1950) pointed out (for the case of many price changes with only endogenous quantities), the construction of m(t) requires solving an ordinary differential equation.
For differentiating (11) totally with respect to t gives
where, as usual,ṗ,ṁ andż denote derivatives with respect to t. Since (A.5) implies that λ is always positive, (12) reduces to the ordinary differential equatioṅ
in the unknown function m(t), with initial condition m(0) =m, of course.
Integrability and Path Independence
Suppose that the demand and willingness to pay functions are derived from preferences satisfying assumptions (A.1-A.5) above. Then equation (13) 
for every positive scalar α. The other condition that is usually invoked, in order to ensure that the differential equation (13) does have a solution, is a form of Lipschitz condition.
This requires the income derivatives x m (p, m; z) and w m (p, m; z) to be bounded on any path along which one wants to solve (13). This will be true automatically whenever these income derivatives are actually continuous functions of (p, m, z).
Of rather more interest are the appropriate versions of the familiar conditions requiring the Slutsky matrix to be both symmetric and negative semi-definite. To investigate this, notice first how (13) satisfying the more general version
of (11). Now, the usual integrability condition is that any possible solution to (14) 
Using Roy's identity (2) and also (4) once again then implies that
In fact, these are really just familiar envelope results for compensated demand and willingness to pay functions. Differentiating (17) partially once more leads to the following equation for the partitioned Hessian matrix (15)
where T denotes the transpose of a matrix. The convention that w, x, w m and x m are all column vectors has also been used. In terms of explicit second order partial derivatives, (18) can be written as
where all the partial derivatives of the generalized income compensation function m are evaluated at (p, z), and all those of the demand and willingness to pay functions are evaluated at (p, m; z).
Note that, except at boundary points of the feasible set F , one has
Then a standard textbook argument establishes concavity of m with respect to p. Moreover,
for some (convex) weights λ, µ with λ + µ = 1. Then, because U is quasi-concave,
It follows that
Therefore m is also concave with respect to z. That is, m is separately concave in p and z, but it is generally not concave as a function of p and z together.
The upper left hand corner of the partitioned matrix (18) or (19) is the familiar Slutsky matrix. The bottom right hand corner is the less familiar Antonelli matrix -see Samuelson (1950) and Hurwicz (1971) . Concavity of m with respect to p and z separately implies that these two sub-matrices must each be negative semi-definite. The whole matrix must be symmetric as well, of course, as a Hessian matrix. But no sign properties can be imposed on the off-diagonal sub-matrices. This completes the specification of the relevant integrability conditions which are sufficient to ensure that the demand and willingness to pay functions do correspond to the solution of a utility maximization problem on the part of the consumer.
Individual Catastrophes
One last important question remains. This is when the money metric utility function is well defined and when it is not. Recall how (6) defines ψ(p, m; z) as the (unique) value of y which solves the equation
-assuming that such a y exists. Now, in the case when all goods can be traded at exogenous prices and there are no exogenous quantities, (23) reduces to
In this case it has been customary to assume that the consumer's consumption set is the non-negative orthant G + , and that there is a fixed endowment vector e. In this special case, the set F of feasible net trades becomes equal to the vector difference For then once again the defining equation (24) has a unique solution whenever there is some
x ∈ F for which p x ≤ m.
I shall now consider the more general case which occurs because the feasible set is not bounded below by an indifference curve, or because some quantities may be exogenous to the consumer. To this end, define
as the minimum income level consistent with individual feasibility when the exogenous price and quantity vectors are at their reference levels. Let
denote the corresponding minimum utility vector. Also, let (p, m, z) . This could be because the change in the exogenous quantity variables from z R to z constitutes some kind of personal disaster -for example, a sufficiently large increase in the probability of death or injury, as in Jones-Lee (1974 . Such changes could also result from some kind of environmental catastrophe. Even without any exogenous quantity variables, however, the simpler equation (24) has already occurred, it is possible that no amount of money is ever enough to restore the consumer to his former level of well-being, and so compensate for the disastrous change from z to z R .
What these possibilities illustrate is that money metrics are at best incomplete measures of welfare and of welfare change. Some alterations in individual circumstances can be so drastic that no finite sum of money can ever compensate, in which case the money metric is undefined. Applied economists should always be aware of this possibility.
Social Welfare and Uniform Variation
Additive Money Metric Utility
This and succeeding sections will consider a finite set I of individuals indicated by subscripts i. Boldface letters will denote profiles of vectors, one for each individual in society. For instance, z will denote the entire list z i i∈I of all the different exogenous quantity vectors z i faced by all the different individuals in society, i ∈ I. Similarly, m will denote the personal distribution of income in society, m i i∈I . The problem then is to know how to construct appropriate money metric measures of social welfare for society as a whole.
One such approach that has been used too much in the past is simply to add up all the different individuals' measures of money metric utility -i.e., one considers the sum
The reference situation (p R , z R ) involves a combination of an exogenous price vector with specified levels of the exogenous quantity vector for each individual separately. Note the assumption that the exogenous price vector p is the same for all individuals, as it will be if the economy has perfectly competitive markets for traded goods. Note too that in the reference situation itself, this additive money metric measure becomes
or just the total level of all unearned income, without any regard whatsoever for its distribution. This complete neglect of any concern for distributive justice explains why this measure has so little ethical appeal. Finally, note the criticisim of Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) . Outside the reference situation, there is no guarantee that the sum of individual money metrics (28) will be concave (or even quasi-concave) as a function of the income distribution m. Hence the implied value judgements could easily value extreme inequality above more equitable distributions of income.
Social Welfare Functions
In order to go beyond crude measures like additive money metric utility, some more sophisticated value judgements and interpersonal comparisons of utility are required. Thus it will be assumed that there exists some direct social welfare function of the Paretian form
where Ω is a strictly increasing function of the vector U i (x i , z i ) i∈I of all the different individual utility levels. The corresponding indirect social welfare function, of course, must be
Total Money Metric Utility
To allow these rather more sophisticated ethical values, Jorgenson and Slesnick (1989, 1990 ) and Jorgenson (1990) have used an alternative method of money metric social welfare measurement. This is based on the idea behind Pollak's (1981) approach to constructing social cost of living indices. The method involves considering the total money income which, if distributed optimally, would yield the same level of social welfare. To define it formally, first let the indirect social welfare function of total income be given by 
In other words, Φ(x, z) is the level of total unearned income which, if available for distribution between all consumers when society faces the reference price vector p R and the reference exogenous profile of quantity vectors z R , and if distributed and then spent optimally on appropriate social welfare maximizing net trade vectors, would make society as a whole just as well off as at (x, z). Note that Φ(x, z) does increase strictly as W (x, z)
increases because, as shown in the previous paragraph, increases in total income M can be used to generate increases in social welfare.
The total money metric indirect utility function Ψ(p, m; z) is defined similarly as the solution to the equation
In the special case when the exogenous variables (p, z) happen to assume their reference becomes an income measure of the social welfare loss due to inequality.
Though such measures do accurately reflect the social welfare function, they will often be rather inconvenient and also hard to interpret. Suppose, for instance, that a policy change results in the economy moving from the original situation
which is a combination of a price vector for traded goods, an unearned income distribution, and profile of exogenous quantity vectors -to the new situation s 1 := (p 1 , m 1 ; z 1 ). Suppose too that this change increases the above money metric measure of social welfare by precisely 100 ecus per head in a society whose population numbers 50 million. This means that the policy change has exactly the same welfare effect as the combination of the following three changes:
(i) with p 0 and z 0 both fixed, the total income M 0 := i∈I m 0 i which is available in the original situation s 0 is reduced to the optimally distributed income equivalentsayM 0 -and thenM 0 is redistributed optimally by means of (first-best) lump-sum transfers in order to achieve a new distribution of income which generates exactly the same level of welfare as s 0 does;
(ii) additional income ∆M whose total is 5 billion ecus -equivalent to 100 ecus per head -is made available in order to bring the new total up toM 0 + ∆M ;
(iii) with p 1 and z 1 both fixed, the new total incomeM 0 + ∆M is redistributed optimally by means of lump-sum transfers, and the result must be a new distribution of income which generates exactly the same level of welfare as s 1 does.
Thus changes in social welfare are always calculated with reference to first-best optimal distributions of income. These are likely to be far from existing distributions, and also unattainable in practice -e.g., because of incentive constraints such as those considered in Hammond (1979 Hammond ( , 1987 and Roberts (1984) . Thus the figure of 100 ecus per head may be rather misleading, since it might be thought to indicate that the welfare effect is the same as if each individual received an extra 100 ecus in the original situation s 0 , instead of in the welfare equivalent situation which only arises when total income has first been reduced tô M 0 and then optimally redistributed.
Finally, the need to calculate the optimally distributed equivalent in each case is likely to be a major inconvenience. For one thing, even if the change from s 0 to s 1 is quite small, the two transitions from s 0 to the welfare equivalent situation with an optimal income distribution, and then from a different optimal income distribution back to s 1 , are both likely to be large and difficult to calculate with much precision. For all these reasons the "uniform variation" measures to be presented below seem definitely more helpful.
The Uniform Money Metric Measure of Social Welfare
In order to construct the uniform money metric measures of social welfare and of social welfare change to be proposed here, not only must both some reference price vector p R ∈ G + and some reference exogenous interpersonal profile of quantity vectors z R = z Since direct money metric measures play no role in the rest of this paper, only the indirect uniform money metric social welfare function µ(p, m; z) will be defined. Formally, it is the (unique) solution to the equation
where 1 denotes the vector in I each of whose components is equal to 1. Note once again how µ(p, m; z) must increase whenever V (p, m; z) does.
In the special case when all the exogenous variables (p, m, z) happen to assume their 
in uniform money metric social welfare.
As in the case of the money metric measure of variation for a single individual, two particular cases are worth especial attention. The first concerns the uniform compensating variation (or UCV), which arises when (p
, so that the final values of the exogenous prices, incomes, and quantities are taken as reference values. Then 
, and so the measure of welfare change (36) reduces to µ(p 1 , m 1 ; z 1 ). In contrast to the uniform compensating variation, the uniform equivalent variation is higher for better changes from an existing status quo. Obviously UEV is itself a welfare indicator. In fact UEV must represent the total amount which the society is willing to be receive, in the form of a uniform poll subsidy on all individuals, in order to avoid making the move from
Small Changes
Having defined uniform equivalent variation and related measures of social welfare 
of each individual i's income. It is these ratios which will appear in the formulae to be derived below.
To find the effect of a small change upon the uniform money metric measure of social welfare, take the total differential of (35) while holding the reference situation (p
fixed. Using Roy's identity (2) and also (4), the result is
In the special case when (p, m, z) is the reference situation (p R , m R , z R ) and so µ(p, m, z) = 0, (37) implies that (38) reduces to the familiar form
For comparison purposes, it is instructive to consider how the total money metric indirect utility function Ψ(p, m; z) of Section 3.3 responds to small changes. The relevant total differential of (34) is
From this it follows that
where
Even in the special case when (p, z) is the reference situation (p R , z R ), (41) does not generally reduce to (39) but maintains an extra factor
The numerator of (43) is the marginal social welfare from giving each individual one unit of extra income in the situation (p R , m, z R ), where the income distribution may be far from optimal. The denominator is the marginal social welfare of extra total income when income is being distributed optimally. Generally, θ R = 1, and in fact θ R is quite awkward to calculate.
A Path Differential Equation
As in the case of individual money metric measures of utility, it will be sufficient to know how to find the uniform money metric measure of social welfare µ(p,m;z) for any point (p,m,z), and with respect to an arbitrary reference point (p R , m R , z R ). So let (p(t), m(t), z(t)) (0 ≤ t ≤ 1) be any continuously differentiable path, parametrized by the real variable t, whose two endpoints are respectively (p(0), m(0), z(0)) = (p,m,z) and 
But other paths are equally valid and could be chosen instead if they happen to be easier to work with.
A uniform income compensation function µ(t) (0 ≤ t ≤ 1) will now be constructed in order to satisfy the equation
all along such a path. Then, when t = 0 and so (p(0), m(0); z(0)) = (p,m,z), it follows that µ(0) = 0. But, when t = 1 and so (p(t), m(t); z(t)) = (p R , m R ; z R ), one will have (p,m,z) . This implies that µ(1) is the required uniform money metric measure of social welfare.
As with the individual money compensation function of Section 2.8, the construction here will also involve solving an ordinary differential equation. Note first how the Paretian form of the indirect social welfare function (31), together with both Roy's identity (2) and the relation (4) between each individual's indirect utility and demand functions, imply that the partial gradient vectors of V with respect to the price vector and with respect to each individual's quantity vector must satisfy
Then, differentiating (44) totally with respect to t shows that 
in the single unknown function µ(t), where all the time arguments have been suppressed.
The initial condition, of course, is µ(0) = 0.
Integrability and Path Independence
As in the case of the individual money metric measure of utility, notice that, when- 
of (44). Nevertheless, the argument which will be used here differs from that in Section 2.9
for the case of a single individual. For, whereas the functions x i (p, m i ; z i ) and w i (p, m i ; z i ) describe the utility-maximizing demand behaviour and willingness to pay of consumer i, the functions ω i (p, m; z) represent the value judgements of whoever is constructing the social welfare measures. Specifically, we already know that there exists a money metric utility function ψ i (p, m i ; z i ) satisfying a version of (6) appropriate to each individual i ∈ I, namely
Then, because the indirect social welfare function has a Paretian form (31), there must exist some strictly increasing function Ω * defined on I with the property that
The obvious condition to be imposed now is that the normalized marginal utility functions ω i (p, m; z) can be derived from such an explicit social welfare function. That is, it must be true that
This is the required condition on the welfare weights ω i (p, m; z) which ensures both integrability and path independence of any possible solution to (48).
Unfortunately, this last condition cannot really be used in its present form. After all, testing it properly requires knowing the function Ω * . Yet the whole purpose of constructing a money metric measure of social welfare is precisely to know what ordering, at least, is induced by different relative values of Ω * . Ideally, therefore, we should be looking instead for a condition that is specified directly in terms of the welfare weight functions ω i (p, m; z)).
This search has been left for later.
Social Catastrophes
As with the individual measures of money metric utility, it is important to consider also when the uniform money metric social welfare function is well defined. To this end,
as individual i's minimum income level consistent with physical feasibility for him alone when the exogenous price and quantity vectors are at their reference levels. Then let
be the maximum uniform poll tax which can be levied in the reference situation (p
without forcing anybody outside their physically feasible set. Also, let
be the corresponding minimum level of social welfare which can be achieved by making the poll tax as large as possible. Finally, let
be the corresponding supremum level of social welfare from an indefinitely large uniform poll subsidy. The value ofV R , of course, could be +∞. As in the similar case of individual money metric utility considered in the previous section, it is obvious that the measure µ(p, m; z) of uniform money metric social welfare is well defined for all (p, m, z) satisfying
When V (p, m; z) < V R , the situation (p, m; z) is so bad that some individuals cannot afford to pay the uniform poll tax which would be needed to reduce social welfare this much. This is a "social catastrophe," in effect. But even so one could still have for the others who are accordingly rather poor. Then, if social welfare has to be reduced by means of a uniform poll tax, there can easily be a limit to how low social welfare can fall because of the limit on how much poll tax the poorer individuals can be forced to pay. In this sense, social catastrophes can arise purely because the distribution of income implies very unequal abilities to pay taxes.
The other problematic case occurs when the situation (p, m; z) is so good that
for all finite scalars µ, no matter how large. Because of the Paretian form of the social welfare function, this can only occur if there exists at least one individual i ∈ I for whom
The corresponding possibility for individuals was discussed in Section 2.9, and nothing more needs to be added here.
Conclusions and Remaining Problems
Summary
Methods of constructing money metric measures of individual and social welfare have been presented. They work even when some important aspects of the environment are subject to change, though with a few important exceptions which can arise in connection with "catastrophes" for which the willingness to pay to avoid them is too large to be properly defined. For individual welfare, the standard money metric was extended in a rather obvious way to deal with exogenous quantity (or environmental quality) variables which affect well-being. In the case of social welfare, however, a "uniform money metric" was proposed. This is based on the amount of a uniform poll tax or subsidy which would produce an equivalent effect on the well-being of society as a whole, according to some specific social welfare function which respects individuals' preferences.
Alternatives to Uniform Poll Taxes and Subsidies
Much of the existing literature concerned with money metric measures of social welfare relies on comparing existing situations with what would be possible in the presence of optimal lump-sum transfers. This makes the measures hard to interpret, since they relate to monetary gains which could only be realized through policies which, because of incentive compatibility problems, are probably totally impractical. As an alternative, uniform poll taxes and subsidies are certainly much more realistic instruments of policy. In some cases, at least, the money metric measures which are based upon them have the merit of indicating how large a welfare gain is possible with a policy that could just possibly be carried out in practice. Yet uniform poll taxes or subsidies may be not after all be much less impractical than lump-sum transfers. This is especially true if we are constructing a measure of social welfare that includes individuals in several different nations. Nor are uniform poll taxes or subsidies likely to be desirable even when they really can be put into effect.
So the policy measure to be used in measuring welfare should be one that is actually quite likely to be carried out in the event that the economy suddenly experiences a windfall gain or loss of some kind. Instead of poll taxes and subsidies, changes in the rate of income taxation seem much more plausible, but would not generate money metric measures.
However, a general alternative which would be a monetary measure could be constructed as follows: first specify a policy rule which determines, as a function of the size of any sudden windfall gain or loss, what tax and other policy changes it is believed that the government would want to carry out in response to a gain or loss of that magnitude. Also specify a reference situation which is believed to be what will happen in the event of a gain or loss of zero. Then, given the level of social welfare in any other situation, find the size of that monetary gain or loss to which the government's policy response would generate exactly the same level of social welfare. This gives rise to a much broader class of money metric measures of social welfare. For, as has already been emphasized, the uniform measure considered here presumes, in effect, that the government will only distribute any gain through a uniform poll subsidy, and will only meet any loss with the revenue from a uniform poll tax.
Time and Uncertainty
At first it may appear that this paper has considered exclusively static models of the economy and the environment. If true, this would obviously be a very serious limitation, especially as environmental damage is often very long-lasting. Yet in fact the same ideas could fairly easily be adapted to intertemporal models as well -cf. the discussion in Hammond (1990b) of economies with dated contingent commodities and consumers, and the resulting dated contingent money metric measures of welfare in each period.
Data
Like my other work in this area, this paper has been purely theoretical. As argued in Hammond (1990a) , before making the compromises which are necessary because data are often very limited or unreliable, I think it is important to understand just how welfare could be measured in an ideal situation with unlimited data. Accordingly this paper presumes unlimited knowledge of all individuals' demand, supply and willingness to pay functions. In order to find the welfare effect of any actual policy change, moreover, it presumes that the resulting comparative static effects upon the prices and quantities which affect consumers are also all known with certainty. It must be admitted that there is an enormous gulf between this extreme hypothesis and what is actually known about real economies. Much work still remains to be done even on the theory of estimating welfare measures which are based on the kind of highly imperfect data which are all that applied economists usually have available. To repeat, this paper has tried to set out the kind of ideal measure which I believe that applied economists should be wanting to construct, if only they could have access to unlimited and completely reliable data.
